Tuesday, May 27, 2008

Fun with the NRC Web Site

Dear God,

Thank you, Lord, for making my life easier. You've given me an automatic garage door, an automatic coffee maker, Google, a Palm Pilot. Everything is one touch/one click, and I'm a happy boy.

And today, you've shown me the means to "one touch/one click" [I'm using it as a verb now] the part of my job that I love the least: reporting safety incidents to the local media. For, with your guidance, I've just blindly stumbled to a page on the Internet that they can use to find out about those events themselves. It's on the NRC web site. They should check every day!

Just look at the link to May 2008, Lord! It's chock full of information. Over just the past few days there were these power plant events nationally:

  • May 23 at Millstone: REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE ON MAIN TRANSFORMER. "Lightning struck the main transformer for Millstone Unit 2 actuation of the reactor protection system…."
  • May 22 at Fort Calhoun: DECAY HEAT REMOVAL COOLING INTERUPTED DURING CORE RELOAD. "At 1956, during reactor core reload with a full refueling cavity, power was lost to the #2 non-vital instrument bus. This power loss resulted in closure of the shutdown cooling temperature control valve…."
  • May 22 at Diablo Canyon: MOBILE CRANE CAUSED DAMAGE TO MET TOWER. "During the performance of work activities in the vicinity of the Met Tower at 10 AM, a mobile crane made contact with a support wire causing damage to the tower. All instrumentation on the tower continues to function, but conservatively has been called inoperable…."
  • May 22 at Browns Ferry: LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM PHONE COMMUNICATIONS. "At 1515 hrs, the control room staff discovered that normal control room phone communications were not working. Additionally, the NRC emergency notification system (red phone) was not functional…."
  • May 21 at Vogtle: LOSS OF FUNCTIONALITY TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER "A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center [TSC] has been lost due to the failure of the TSC Chiller to maintain chilled water within the normal control band…."
  • May 21 at San Onofre: OFFSITE POWER GRID DISTURBANCE. "On Tuesday, May 20, 2008, at approximately 1310 PDT, the offsite power grid connected to San Onofre experienced a momentary system disturbance…."
  • May 21 at Fort Calhoun. DECAY HEAT REMOVAL COOLING INTERUPTED DURING CORE RELOAD. "At 1956, during reactor core reload with a full refueling cavity, power was lost to the #2 non-vital instrument bus. This power loss resulted in closure of the shutdown cooling temperature control valve, HCV-341…."
  • On May 19 at Surrey: FAILED RELAY CAUSES EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TO START. "At 0904 on 5/17/2008, ' D' and 'E' transfer busses were lost due to a failed relay on a supply breaker in the switchyard…."


This page is probably where all sorts of Vermont Yankee events have been reported—-the 62 cracks in the steam dryer, the current unresolved condenser leak, last fall's cooling tower collapse, the missing spent fuel rod, the valve problem resulting in a scram, yadda yadda ho hum. Even the little ones get reported here. Instead of taking all of the heat myself and questions from the media after all of those events, I could have just sat back, relaxed, and let everyone find out themselves, one touch/one click. Full details are available. I actually can't find mention of the recent crane malfunction regarding the dry cask but, frankly, there's probably a limit to what the public needs to know.

Thanks for letting me know, Lord, even if you did let me know a few years late. And, hey, Lord? What about the future? Is there a one touch/one click page that can show the media unexpected problems to come? I'm asking because, well, you know those journalists. They're always on deadline and would appreciate a heads up now and then, and I like to keep them on my side.

Amen,

Fake-Rob

1 comment:

Anonymous said...

Dear Fakerob: here, belatedly, is an interesting find from the NRC website, I think it was a morning report, which I had cut and pasted into my file called "VY screw-ups" a long time ago:
Discussion:
Part 21 2005-0003-00 - Overstress Condition on "Single Failure Proof" Crane Trolleys

As a part of a crane re-rate analysis, on January 5, 2005, Whiting Corporation, a crane vendor, reported an overstress condition on some hoist equalizer plates and welds. The vendor stated that the overstress condition is limited to the main hoist of redundant (single failure proof) cranes having capacities of 125 tons.

The following is a list of potentially affected single failure proof cranes;

Nine Mile Point - 125 Ton (2)
Dresden - 125 Ton
Quad Cities - 125 Ton
Waterford (Unit 1) - Reactor Room
Vermont Yankee - Reactor Room - 110 Ton